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Abstract:  In this paper, we estimate the social net benefits of curbside recycling.  Benefits are 
estimated using household survey data from over 4,000 households across 40 western U.S. cities.  
We calibrate household willingness-to-pay for hypothetical bias using an innovative 
experimental design that contrasts stated and revealed preferences.  Cost estimates are compiled 
from previous studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Institute for Local 
Self Reliance, and from interviews with recycling coordinators in our sampled cities.  
Remarkably, we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside recycling is almost 
exactly zero.
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1. Introduction 
One of society’s greatest challenges is determining optimal allocations for environmental 
goods, such as old-growth forests, wetlands, spotted owls, wolf habitat, clean air, etc.  The 
primary difficulty with this type of problem is measuring the social benefits accruing from the 
provision of these goods.  Unlike private goods, environmental goods have a large public-good 
component that encourages free-riding behavior.  Furthermore, their prices are not determined in 
well-developed markets.  As a consequence, it is often necessary to estimate the benefits from 
environmental goods through non-market valuation methods, such as contingent valuation.   
In this paper, we focus on one such environmental good – curbside recycling.  Recycling is 
typically thought to benefit the environment by diverting solid waste from landfills, which can 
pollute groundwater, produce airborne pollutants, and compete for open space (U.S. EPA, 1992).  
At the same time, however, recycling programs are costly.  They require households to clean, 
sort, store and deliver recyclables.  Furthermore, curbside recycling programs (CRPs) divert 
resources from other societal programs and services such as public education, highway 
maintenance, welfare programs, etc.  Our goal in this paper is to provide a comprehensive 
measure of the social net benefits of curbside recycling, in order to help answer the often 
contentious question:  “Should we be recycling?”      
We have witnessed a renewed national debate regarding the efficacy of recycling in the wake 
of New York City’s recent decision to suspend collection of plastics and glass.
1  Mayor 
Bloomberg’s and the city council’s decision appears to be based primarily on claims that the 
recycling of glass and plastics is cost ineffective (Johnson, 2002).  Cost effectiveness is an 
understandable criterion for municipalities under tight fiscal budgets, given the absence of   4
reliable estimates of the social benefits of recycling.  However, by failing to assess both the 
social costs and benefits, we are left to wonder whether policymakers (such as New York’s 
mayor and city council) are making socially efficient decisions. 
This paper represents a first attempt at establishing an economic basis for making such 
decisions.  On the benefit side, we use contingent valuation methods (CVM) and responses from 
over 4,000 households located in 40 metropolitan areas throughout the western U.S. to estimate 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for CRPs.
2  A common criticism of CVM is that respondents tend to 
overstate their true WTP due to the hypothetical nature of the good and payment vehicle.  Unlike 
previous CVM studies, we address this problem directly by estimating the magnitude of the 
potential hypothetical bias in our WTP data.  The unique nature of our dataset and experimental 
design allows us to estimate this magnitude by contrasting stated-preference information (from 
CVM) with revealed-preference information from actual decisions made by households in 
communities with voluntary CRPs.
3  Using this estimate of hypothetical bias, we then calibrate 
the corresponding WTP estimates to the decisions made by households in a real market setting.
4   
On the cost side, we utilize information from a wide array of communities to obtain an 
estimated per-household economic cost of providing curbside recycling services.  In calculating 
the costs of curbside recycling, we include both explicit variable and fixed costs, as well as the 
opportunity costs associated with diverting public resources away from their next most 
productive use. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 New York City is not alone among large cities that are reevaluating the efficacy of their recycling programs.  For 
example, Denver, CO is considering a drastic scaling back its curbside recycling program (Brovsky and Larson, 
2003). 
2 Due to budget limitations, our population does not include the eastern U.S.   
3 “Voluntary” CRPs require households to pay only if they have signed up for the program while “mandatory” CRPs 
require all households to pay, irrespective of whether they have signed up or not. 
4 We use CVM to estimate benefits (rather than derive such measures using market prices and aggregate 
participation levels) because much of the data from established markets for voluntary curbside recycling are 
proprietary and also would not generally include information at the household level.   5
The next section presents a simple theoretical framework that describes the management of 
solid waste at both the household and community levels. This framework guides our ensuing 
empirical analysis.  In section three, we introduce the data sources used in developing measures 
of economic costs and benefits.  In section four, we present our econometric model for 
estimating WTP, including the methods used to mitigate hypothetical bias, and discuss our 
empirical results.  In section five, we discuss the policy implications of our empirical findings 
and suggest some possible avenues for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical  Model 
Our model involves an equilibrium relationship between households and a community 
planner, whereby households make utility-maximizing decisions in response to the planner’s 





Given the policy decisions of the community planner, household i, i = 1,…,n, is assumed to 
maximize utility by choosing recycling effort, ei, and the composite good, zi, subject to its budget 
constraint.  Household solid waste, wi, is generated as a function of consumption according to    
wi = λzi, where 0 < λ < 1.  Preferences are given by 
  ii i i i u u(z,l,g,G; ) = θ                         ( 1 )  
where li is the fraction of non-market time spent in leisure, gi = wi – ri is the net amount of waste 
generated by the household, G = Σi gi is aggregate net waste generated in the community, and i θ    6
is a vector of household-specific characteristics.  There is a tradeoff between leisure and the 
effort required to clean, sort, store and deliver the recyclables (either to the curb or to a 
centralized dropoff site).  We assume the tradeoff is given by  ii l1 e = − , where maximum leisure 
is normalized to unity.  We also assume that u is strictly increasing in zi and li, and weakly 
decreasing in gi and G.
6  Similar to Andreoni’s (1990) impure-altruism model, household i may 
receive private non-pecuniary (e.g., “warm glow”) benefits from recycling due to a sense of 
ethical fulfillment (measured at the margin by –ug), as well as public benefits associated with 
contributing to the community’s aggregate level of recycling (e.g., helping to increase the 
landfill’s lifespan), measured by –uG.  This creates a possible external effect since households 
have no apparent incentive to fully internalize the effect of their private recycling activity on the 
welfare of other households.  The assumption of impurely altruistic households is based on our 
survey results showing that the primary motivation behind the decision to recycle for 
approximately 90% of the sampled households is “an ethical duty to help the environment”.  We 
discuss this issue further in Section 5. 
We assume that curbside recycling effort transforms into recyclables according to the 
function ri = r(ei) where r(0) = 0.  The function r is assumed increasing and concave in ei.  
Dropoff recycling involves an additional amount of effort, ci, defined in terms of transportation 
costs.  Therefore, dropoff-recycling effort will result in ri = r(ei - ci), where if ei < ci then ri = 0.   
The household budget constraint is represented by 
ii i yp z ≥+ τ φ                        ( 2 )  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 See Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) for alternative general equilibrium models of 
recycling and other “green policies” at the household level.  
6 We further assume that conditions on u are such that sufficient second-order conditions for utility maximization 
hold, ensuring a well-defined solution.   7
where yi is household income, p is zi’s corresponding price index, τ is the recycling fee, and φi is 
a binary variable equal to one if household i voluntarily signs up for a CRP (or is automatically 
signed up by virtue of a community mandate) and zero otherwise.
7 
In formulating its WTP for curbside recycling, the household first chooses its recycling effort 
to maximize (1) subject to (2) and the r(ei) transformation function.  The solution to this problem 
can be used to derive the household’s indirect utility function, ii i vv ( p , , y) = τ, θ .
8  Assuming v is 
strictly increasing in yi, one can invert any reference vi with respect to yi to produce the 
household’s expenditure function,  ii i mm ( , v ) = θ , where p andτ are dropped for convenience.  
In this case, we set the reference indirect utility,
0
i v , equal to the maximum utility for a household 
that does not participate in a CRP.  WTP for curbside recycling is then derived by subtracting the 
household’s minimum expenditure given that it participates in the CRP from its minimum 
expenditure given that it does not participate:   
00
ii i i i i i WTP m( ,v | 0) m( ,v | 1) =φ = −φ = θθ .                   (3) 
In other words, WTP for household i is defined by the amount of income the household would 
willingly forego so as to participate in a CRP and maintain the original utility level
0
i v.   T h e  
household’s WTP for curbside recycling may be negative if the disutility of foregone leisure is 
sufficiently large relative to the utility gained from recycling.   
 
                                                           
7 To keep the model simple, we abstract from the possibility that households save money by recycling – either by 
receiving direct revenue from the sale of dropoff recyclables (e.g., selling aluminum cans or newspapers) or by 
reducing the size of their garbage container.  We note, however, that these features could be incorporated into the 
budget constraint in a straightforward manner. 
8 Details of the household’s optimal choice of recycling effort are shown in an appendix, which can be found at 
www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/appendix.pdf.   8
2.2. Community Planner 
The community planner is responsible for managing municipal solid waste G by (a) selecting 
a type of CRP indexed by j ∈ {N,M,V}, where N, M and V refer to no, mandatory and  
voluntary curbside recycling respectively; and (b) selecting the household curbside recycling fee, 
τ.  The planner is assumed to face a balanced-budget constraint
9  
jj nC ( n , j ) τ=                                            (4) 
where nj represents the number of participants for CRP type j and C is the total economic cost of 
providing curbside recycling.  The number of participants are nN = 0, nM = n, and nV = n*, where 
n is the number of households participating in the mandatory CRP and n* is defined by the 
number of households that satisfy WTPi ≥ τ under a voluntary program.  C includes both explicit 
fixed and variable components, as well as the implicit costs associated with the foregone use of 
resources allocated toward a CRP (further discussion of these costs is provided in the next 
section).  Based on interviews with community recycling coordinators and private contractors 
(discussed further in Section 3), we also assume that marginal cost (MC) is positive and constant 
across nj.  Thus, average total cost (ATC) is asymptotically coincident with MC. 
The community planner then uses this benefit and cost information, along with budget-
balance condition (4), to simultaneously determine whether to establish a CRP, and if so, which 
type and at what fee level.  We begin by stating the condition required for the community 
planner to offer a CRP of either type M or V.  
                                                           
9 We recognize that economic efficiency requires that households be serviced up to the point where price equals 
marginal, rather than average, costs.  We have chosen to focus on balance-budget pricing, however, for two reasons.  
First, municipal CRPs are commonly expected to be self-sustaining and thus not dip continuously into general tax 
revenues to cover costs (based on our own personal interviews with community recycling coordinators and private 
contractors for this study).  Note that for mandatory programs, where all households are required to pay for the 
service, the CRP fee is simply a de facto form of lump-sum taxation and the natural fee is the one causing revenues 
to just match total costs.  Second, we observe communities without mandated recycling goals choosing mandatory   9
 
CRP Condition I.  Given (3) and (4), the community planner will offer a CRP of either type 
M or V, if and only if 
M n
i i1 WTP C(n,M) WTP ATC(n,M)
= ≥⇒ ≥ ∑ or 
V n* *
i i1 WTP C(n ,V) WTP ATC(n ,V)
∗




WTP denote the mean 
WTP for mandatory and voluntary communities, respectively.  
 
In other words, the community planner will offer a CRP of either type M or V if the mean 
WTP exceeds the ATC (evaluated at the number of participating households) for that program 
type.  Figure 1 depicts the geometry for CRP Condition I.  The aggregate marginal surplus (AMS) 
curve, drawn linear for simplification, depicts the change in aggregate WTP as the number of 
households increases, beginning with the household with the largest WTP and ending with the 
household whose WTP is lowest. 
The household fee for the voluntary program, τV, is determined by budget balance at the 
intersection between the AMS and ATC curves, which also determines the number of 
participating households, n*, and the total net community surplus, area A.  In this case, the 
voluntary program passes CRP Condition I.  A mandatory program charges a household fee of τM, 
which by the budget-balance condition is consistent with n participating households.  The 
mandatory program also passes CRP Condition I if area A+B+C is larger than area F+G +H.  
Conversely, both voluntary and mandatory programs would fail CRP Condition I if, for example, 
the AMS curve lied everywhere beneath the ATC curve.  In this case, no τ could be found to 
satisfy (4), and thus a CRP of neither type would be offered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
CRPs.  Since we know there are households with WTP less than marginal costs, this suggests an objective other than 
economic efficiency (e.g., a balanced-budget criterion).                 10
If CRP Condition I is satisfied, the community planner then determines which type of 
program to offer.  The following condition gives the condition required for choosing a voluntary 
or mandatory CRP.   
 
CRP Condition II.  Assume CRP Condition I is satisfied.  The community planner chooses a 
voluntary (mandatory) CRP if 
V * WTP ATC(n ,V) −  is greater (less) than 
M
WTP ATC(n,M) −  with corresponding household fee τV (τM) satisfying (4).   
 
In other words, a voluntary program is chosen over a mandatory program whenever the 
household fees and participation levels for the two programs are such that the net community 
surplus from the voluntary program is greater than that from the mandatory program.
10 
Figure 1 also depicts the geometry for CRP Condition II.  Moving from a voluntary to a 
mandatory CRP, n* households obtain a net-surplus increase of area B, while n – n* households 
obtain a net-surplus change of area C – F – G – H.  Therefore, if area B + C – F – G – H > 0, a 
mandatory program is chosen under CRP Condition II with fee τM; otherwise a voluntary 
program is chosen with fee τV.  As shown in Figure 1, the probability that a voluntary CRP is 
chosen increases, all else equal, as the ATC curve becomes flatter.  Alternatively, mandatory 
CRPs have a greater probability of being chosen at higher fixed-to-variable cost ratios.   
In closing, our joint household-community planner model makes clear predictions about the 
social efficiency of various recycling options and enables us to predict which types of recycling 
programs should be observed in the different communities in our sample.  Before making these 
                                                           
10 CRP Condition II is therefore consistent with the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.   11
predictions, however, we first introduce the data sources used to estimate the costs and benefits 
of the various CRPs sampled from our population. 
 
3.   Cost and Benefit Data  
3.1. Cost Data 
Our CRP cost data was obtained from two sources:  (a) interviews with community recycling 
coordinators and private contractors, and (b) published studies by the Institute for Local Self-
Reliance (ILSR) (1991) and Franklin Associates, Ltd (1997).  The ILSR study provides detailed 
cost information for Seattle, WA and West Linn, OR, while the Franklin Associates study 
provides information for Olathe, KS.  From the recycling coordinators and private contractors, 
we obtained cost information for eight cities – seven communities in our sample and Portland, 
OR.
11  This information is shown in Table 1. 
  The costs are based on explicit fixed and variable expenses for collection and processing 
incurred during the most recent year available.  They are reported on a per-household per-month 
basis in order to be directly comparable with our benefit information.
12  The costs have also been 
adjusted for cost-of-living differences across communities (MSN, 2003), and in the case of 
Seattle, West Linn, and Olathe appropriate adjustments for inflation have been made using the 
consumer price index (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003).  In addition to the CRP costs, Table 1 
also includes information on the number of participating households per year, percentage of the 
                                                           
11 Cost information was unavailable for many of our sampled communities because it does not exist, cannot be 
extracted from overall waste-disposal cost information, or is proprietary.   
12 Costs are reported as an average cost over the lifetime of the program.  This reflects the fact that recycling 
coordinators and contractors are generally required to report on an annual basis and that CRPs are generally 
associated with relatively long planning horizons (e.g., 10-20 years) over which up-front capital costs are spread.  As 
a result, we do not attempt to calculate net present value estimates based on the specific periods in which the costs 
are incurred.  Rather, we presume that the monthly cost estimates provided by the recycling coordinators accurately 
reflect what a community can expect to incur during any given month of any given year. 
   12
community’s population participating, as well as indicators for whether the CRP is mandatory 
and whether household sorting of recyclables is required. 
  Several observations can be made from the information provided in Table 1.  To begin, the 
estimated mean monthly cost per household across the eleven communities equals $2.93, with a 
coefficient of variation of 33%, implying a fairly tight distribution of cost estimates around the 
mean.  Second, because each CRP in our sample is different in terms of items collected, 
collection frequency, whether it is a mandatory or voluntary program, degree of sorting required, 
etc., we are unable to identify a single underlying ATC curve.  As a result, the numbers from 
Table 1 likely represent distinct points along several different ATC curves, rather than points 
along a single curve.  Lastly, there seems to be a weak relationship between costs and whether 
the CRP is mandatory or voluntary.  Five of the six most cost-efficient CRPs are voluntary.    
 
3.2. Survey Data and Design 
  Turning to the benefit data, we conducted a random-digit dialed telephone survey regarding 
recycling behavior during the winter of 2002 to over 4,000 households in 40 western U.S. cities 
with populations over 50,000.
13  We chose an approximately even three-way split between 
communities with a voluntary, a mandatory and no CRP.  We purposefully over-sampled 
households in communities with voluntary CRPs to allow for the detection of any hypothetical 
bias in the data.  To supplement the household data, we also conducted a telephone survey of the 
recycling coordinators in each of the 40 cities in order to provide specific information on the 
attributes and history of recycling in their respective communities.   
   13
4.  Econometric Methodology and WTP Estimates  
  In this section, we discuss (a) the double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) model used 
to obtain our welfare estimates, (b) the estimation results for overall WTP, (c) the identification 
and estimation of hypothetical bias across the different program types (i.e., M, V, and N), and (d) 
the calibration of the mean WTP estimates for a select group of cities. 
 
4.1. Econometric Model 
  Our econometric approach follows Cameron and James (1987).  WTP questions are set in the 
DBDC format to elicit a household’s WTP through a sequence of dichotomous-choice questions.  
The first question is:  “Would you be willing to pay $ν for the service?”  The opening bid ν is 
chosen randomly from a set of predetermined values.
14   Based on her response to the opening 
bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up question, but with a larger bid value, 2ν, if 
she answered “yes” (i.e., she is willing to pay at least ν for the service) or a smaller bid, 0.5ν, if 
she answered “no” (i.e., she is unwilling to pay ν for the service).  
  Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up questions, the respondent’s latent 
WTP may be placed in one of four regions:  (-∞,0.5ν), (0.5ν, ν), (ν, 2ν) or (2ν, ∞).  Unlike other 
CVM studies, we follow up with a third valuation question for those who respond “no” to the 
first two valuation questions:  “Would you be willing to use the service if it were free of 
charge?”  Previous experience with household recycling surveys suggests that some households 
have negative WTP values, or in other words need to be paid to participate in a CRP (Haab and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 The survey was administered by the survey research laboratory at Washington State University.  The response and 
cooperation rates were 27% and 49%, respectively.  The survey instrument and a list of the 40 cities in our sample 
are available at www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/datareport.pdf. 
14 The opening bids are chosen with equal probabilities from the set of integers two through 10.  This set 
encompasses the range of household fees charged by the communities in our sample.   14
McConnell, 1997; Aadland and Caplan, 2003).  As a result, our survey generates five rather than 
four valuation regions with (-∞,0.5ν) being replaced by (-∞, 0) and (0, 0.5ν).
15  
Turning to our econometric model, we specify a reduced-form version of (3) where the 
dependent variable is WTPi and the explanatory variables Xi include the household-specific 
characteristics ( i θ ) and various community-specific effects.  A stochastic error term εi is added 
to capture the portion of WTPi unexplained by Xi, implying 
iii WTP =+ ε Xβ ,                               (5) 
where β is a vector of coefficients.  The variance of the error terms is assumed to follow  
 
2
ii exp( ) σ= Z γ ,                                     (6) 
where Zi is a vector of variables (possibly intersecting with Xi) and γ is a vector of parameters.  
  We further assume that the error terms are mutually independent and normally distributed.  
Letting  Pi,j indicate the probability that household i’s true WTP falls in the j
th region, the (log) 







=ω ∑∑ ,                        (7) 
where wi,j = 1 if the stated WTP value falls in the j
th region and 0 otherwise.
  The definitions of 
the explanatory variables used in equations (5) and (6) are provided in Table 2.  
 
                                                           
15 Some respondents answered “Don’t Know” to one or more of the valuation questions.  For these households, their 
unknown WTP does not fit into one of the five categories, but instead overlaps one or more of the intervals.  For 
example, if a respondent answered “Don’t Know” to whether they would be willing to pay $ν and “Yes” to whether 
they would be willing to pay $0.5ν, we assume that their unknown WTP falls in the region (0.5ν, ∞).  The 
likelihood function is adjusted accordingly.    15
4.2. Econometric Results 
  In columns two and three of Table 3, we report our DBDC estimates from maximizing (7) 
across all (N = 4012) households in our sample.  First, note that the overall mean estimated WTP 
is approximately $5.35 per month.
16  This estimate is larger than those reported in Lake et al. 
(1996); approximately the same as in Caplan and Grijalva (2003); but smaller than those in 
Aadland and Caplan (2003) and Caplan et al. (2003).  
  Second, we find several individual- and community-specific characteristics that are 
significantly related to WTP for curbside recycling.  To highlight a few, those willing to pay the 
most are (a) young; (b) female; (c) highly educated; (d) motivated to recycle because of an 
ethical duty to help the environment; (e) members of an environmental organization; (f) rated 
their current CRP as good or excellent; and (g) not needing to sort their recyclables.  Many of 
these effects are similar to those found in Aadland and Caplan (2003).  The likelihood ratio 
statistic used to test for overall goodness of fit is 883.27 with a 1% critical value equal to 156.65.  
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of a significant amount of the variation in WTP 
being explained by household, community, and program attributes.   
  Third, we test for heteroscedasticity using (6).  By construction of the bid design, BID is 
systematically related to the variance of the latent WTP errors.  Recall that the opening bids are 
even integers between two and 10, with subsequent bids equal to either half or twice the opening 
amount.  Therefore, the bid design generates larger WTP intervals (and thus more uncertainty 
regarding the true WTP) for higher opening bids.  As expected, the coefficient on BID is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level.  Furthermore, the likelihood ratio statistic used to test 
                                                           
16We have also tested for possible incentive incompatibility and starting-point bias using an approach originally 
suggested by Whitehead (2002) and later modified by Aadland and Caplan (2004b).  We find evidence of starting-
point bias but no incentive incompatibility.  The mean WTP estimates for the two models (one controlling for   16
the null hypothesis that γ = 0 in (6) is 510.75 with a 1% critical value equal to 6.63.  Therefore, 
we reject the null hypothesis in favor of heteroscedastic errors.   
  
4.3. Calibrating WTP for Hypothetical Bias 
  The potential for hypothetical bias arises whenever people are asked to provide a maximum 
amount they are willing to pay for a good or service, even though they will not have to actually 
pay for it (cf., Arrow et al. 1993; Hanemann, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1994).  We estimate 
the magnitude of the bias in each of our community types – voluntary, mandatory and no CRP – 
and calibrate the mean WTP estimates accordingly.  In CVM it is typically not possible to 
estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias because the good under question is not typically 
traded in an established market.  Even if the good is traded in an established market, one needs 
sufficient variation in the price of both the hypothetical and actual goods. With this in mind, our 
experiment was designed to include two different groups (one making stated decisions and the 
other making revealed decisions) and price variation across both hypothetical and actual CRPs.  
This feature of our data enables us to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias for each of our 
community types.  We begin with voluntary CRP communities. 
  
4.3.1. Estimating Hypothetical Bias:  Communities with Voluntary CRPs 
  We first extract two non-overlapping subsamples of households from the dataset:  (a) 
households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that made a hypothetical decision 
about whether to participate in their existing CRP at a randomly assigned initial bid and (b) 
households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that have made an actual decision 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility and one not) are very similar.  As a result, we report the results 
from the latter model. The results from the former model are available from the authors upon request.       17
about whether to participate in their existing CRP.  Households in the second subsample (N = 
538) have revealed their preferences for curbside recycling, while households in the first 
subsample (N = 630) are simply stating their preferences for curbside recycling.  The subsample 
of stated-preference households was restricted to those whose initial (cost-of-living adjusted) 
bids were between $1.30 and $4.94 per month in order to be directly comparable with the 
existing fees faced by the revealed-preference households. 
  Next, we pool these two groups together and estimate a probit model for the decision of 
whether to participate in a voluntary CRP, controlling for a host of household, program, and 
community attributes.  We also allow the error variances to differ according to whether 
households are stating or revealing their preferences (Adamowicz et al., 1994).  Our null 
hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing the statistical significance of the 
coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation decision is hypothetical or real.  
If this coefficient is positive and statistically significant, we conclude that the typical household 
in a community with a voluntary CRP will, all else equal, tend to overstate their WTP for 
curbside recycling by the value of the coefficient. The estimation results for this model, shown in 
columns four and five of Table 3, indicate that hypothetical bias for households in voluntary 
CRP communities is nearly $2 per month.
17   
 
4.3.2. Estimating Hypothetical Bias:  Communities with a Mandatory or No CRP  
  Next, we estimate hypothetical bias for households residing in communities with either a 
mandatory or no CRP, using methods similar to those described above.  In this case, the 
revealed-preference group includes all households residing in voluntary CRP communities with 
                                                           
17 For more details about this method of detecting and estimating the magnitude of hypothetical bias see Aadland 
and Caplan (2004a).   18
existing (cost-of-living-adjusted) fees between $1.30 and $4.94 per month and that are aware of 
the program’s existence, irrespective of the initial bid that they received (N = 994).
18   
  There are two stated-preference groups in this case – those making hypothetical decisions 
about their mandatory CRP (N = 332) and those in communities without a CRP who are deciding 
about a hypothetical CRP described in the survey (N = 788).  We then pool all three groups – the 
revealed-preference voluntary CRP group, the mandatory CRP group, and the hypothetical CRP 
group – and estimate a probit model to predict whether a household participates in a CRP.  As 
before, we control for a wide variety of household, program and community attributes, and we 
allow error variances to differ by CRP type and whether the households are stating or revealing 
their preferences.  Two variables of most interest are the binary ones for whether the stated-
preference households are located in a community with either a mandatory or no CRP.  If the 
coefficients on these dummy variables are positive and statistically significant, we interpret this 
as evidence of positive hypothetical bias.  In other words, when faced with the decision of 
whether to sign up for a CRP, all else equal, households located in a mandatory or no CRP 
community that are making a hypothetical decision are more likely to do so (and consequently 
have a higher latent WTP) than those making an actual decision. 
  The results from this experiment, shown in columns six and seven of Table 3, indicate that 
hypothetical bias among households in mandatory and no CRP communities is $2.65 and $2.77 
per month, respectively.  As anticipated, the bias estimate for the typical household in a 
mandatory CRP community is lower (albeit slightly) than that for the no-CRP community, and 
both of these estimates are higher than that for the typical household in a voluntary CRP 
                                                           
18 We estimate hypothetical bias for the mandatory and no CRP households separately from the bias in the voluntary 
CRP households because the revealed-preference group in this section is larger than that in Section 4.3.1.    19
community.  This ordering suggests that the experience associated with voluntarily signing up 
for and/or using a CRP enables households to more accurately determine their true WTP.    
 
4.3.3. Calibrated WTP 
  Using the hypothetical bias estimates from the previous two sections, we can adjust the mean 
WTP estimates, conditional on whether the household resides in a voluntary, mandatory, or no 
CRP community.  Also, using city-level U.S. Census Bureau data (2000) we are able to adjust 
the estimates to better represent population demographics.  Making adjustments for hypothetical 
bias and sampling error, we find that the average calibrated WTP value across the 40 
communities in our sample is $2.92 (see bottom of Table 3).  Table 4 provides additional details 
on the calibration process for the nine cities in our sample with available cost data and three 
randomly selected non-CRP cities.  In terms of estimated WTP, these 12 cities are representative 
of our sample of 40 cities and highlight the diversity across communities.  It is interesting to note 
that the estimated average monthly benefits per household from curbside recycling range from a 
high of nearly $5 in Tempe, AZ to a low of slightly more than $1 in Palo Alto, CA. 
  
5.  Policy Analysis and Conclusions 
  Remarkably, by comparing our mean calibrated WTP and cost estimates, we conclude that 
the social net benefits of curbside recycling are almost exactly zero.  As a result, to determine 
whether it is an efficient use of society’s resources, we need to evaluate curbside recycling on a 
city-by-city basis.      
  In Table 5, we take a closer look at the 12 communities included in Table 4.  Calibrated WTP 
values from Table 4 and per-household costs from Table 1 are provided in columns 2 and 3.    20
Column 4 presents the corresponding social net benefits of curbside recycling, which vary 
greatly across the 12 communities.  For example, monthly net benefits in Tempe, AZ are $3.27 
per household, while in Palo Alto, CA they are -$3.08.  At their current populations and rates of 
CRP participation, this amounts to annualized net benefits of $1.5 million in Tempe and nearly   
-$1.0 million in Palo Alto.     
  The last two columns of Table 5 compare the observed recycling programs with our 
theoretical/empirical predictions.  The column titled “CRP Predictions” shows that five of the 12 
communities satisfy CRP Condition I (i.e., social net benefits of curbside recycling are positive).  
Of these five, two communities have mandatory CRPs (Tempe, AZ and Longmont, CO), while 
the remaining three have voluntary CRPs.  CRP Condition II predicts that Tempe and Longmont 
may have mandatory CRPs because of high fixed-to-variable cost ratios (relative to Orem, 
Wichita and Fargo).  Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis since we were unable to attain 
reliable fixed and variable cost information for Tempe and Longmont.  
  Of the seven communities that we predict should not have a CRP, three (Abilene, Peoria and 
Inglewood) represent correct predictions and four (Escondido, Olathe, Newport Beach and Palo 
Alto) do not.  The most probable explanation for why Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto 
have chosen mandatory CRPs (when our estimates suggest that their social net benefits are 
clearly negative) is that California has implemented a state-mandated recycling goal.  Recall that 
we have not incorporated mandatory recycling goals into our theoretical model. 
  In sum, using our theoretical model and estimates of net social benefits, we have correctly 
predicted the choice of whether or not to implement a CRP for 8 of the 12 selected communities.  
Furthermore, if Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto have in fact chosen mandatory CRPs   21
in order to meet a state-mandated recycling goal, then we can explain all but one community’s 
(Olathe, KS) choice of whether or not to provide a CRP.               
  Next, we highlight the main shortcomings of our approach.  On the one hand, our mean WTP 
estimates may understate the social benefit of recycling if survey respondents are not fully 
internalizing the public benefits associated with recycling.  As mentioned in Section 2, we have 
assumed that households are “impurely altruistic”, in the sense that although they are motivated 
to recycle out of an “ethical responsibility to help the environment,” they may not be fully 
internalizing the effects of their recycling effort on the welfare of other households located in 
their community.  To the extent that each household values increased aggregate recycling, this 
may cause us to understate the social net benefit of recycling. 
  On the other hand, it is possible that we may be overstating the net benefits of curbside 
recycling.  The issue of how to account for implicit opportunity costs through discounting is 
hotly debated (Hanley and Spash, 1993).  We have tacitly assumed that the opportunity cost 
associated with diverting resources toward curbside recycling is the foregone interest income at 
the market interest rate, which in turn is assumed to equal the social discount rate.  As a result, 
discounting completely offsets any accumulated opportunity costs.  To the degree that the market 
interest rate exceeds the social discount rate, the social net benefit of recycling will diminish, 
possibly becoming negative.  In other words, the explicit costs reported in Table 1 are assumed 
to be the full economic costs associated with curbside recycling. 
  In sum, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, this is the most comprehensive study to-
date of the social efficiency of curbside recycling.  The study covers approximately 20 western 
U.S. states, surveying over 4,000 households and recycling coordinators in 40 different 
communities.  The benefit measure generated from the household survey is carefully calibrated   22
for hypothetical bias by contrasting with the actual decisions of households residing in 
communities with voluntary CRPs.  The economic cost of providing curbside recycling services 
is estimated from direct interviews with the recycling coordinators from cities within our sample 
and from previous research compiled by the U.S. EPA and ISLR.  Remarkably, we find that, on 
average, the benefits and costs per household are almost exactly identical. 
  Although this finding lends scientific credibility to an often contentious national recycling 
debate, it does little to guide national opinion regarding the efficiency of municipal recycling 
programs.  At a local level, however, our research suggests that the public policy choices are 
often much more clear.  Cities with significantly positive net social benefits should be supporting 
curbside recycling programs while cities with significantly negative net social benefits should 
consider other waste management options.  Toward that end, our research provides local 
policymakers within our population of western U.S. states the additional tools necessary to 
decide whether to implement or maintain a CRP.  A natural next step would be to extend our 
research to the eastern U.S. where the constraints on landfill space are more binding, and to 
obtain more precise CRP cost data across a wider variety of communities.  To accomplish this, 
more case studies of existing CRPs are required (along the lines of ILSR, 1991; U.S. EPA, 1994; 
Franklin Associates, Ltd., 1997; and Kinnaman, 2000).  This would enable us to more accurately 
estimate the marginal and average costs of providing curbside recycling and to identify programs 
that are the most cost effective.    23
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Table 1.  Costs per Household and Other Characteristics for CRPs 
City 
Cost ($) per 
Household 












Tempe, AZ  1.62  38,000  60  Yes  Yes 
Seattle, WA
e 1.71  113,484  44  No  No
f 
West Linn, OR
e  2.21 4,956  61  No  Yes 
Fargo, ND  2.68  1,452  4  No  Yes 
Orem, UT  2.78
b 5,400  23  No  No 
Portland, OR
c 2.89  139,431  62  Yes  Yes 
Longmont, CO  3.03
g  22,950 86  Yes  Yes 
Escondido, CA  3.16
b NA  NA  Yes  Yes 
Newport Beach, CA  3.42  27,700  84  Yes  Yes 
Olathe, KS
a  3.58
b 30,000  93  No  Yes 
Palo Alto, CA  5.10
d 25,216  100  Yes  No 
Mean  2.93 40,859 61.7  ---  --- 
Coefficient of Var.  0.33 1.15 0.50  ---  --- 
Notes.  
aBased on figures provided by Franklin Associates, Ltd., “Solid Waste Management at the Crossroads,” 
December 1997.  
bSince the revenues from the sale of recyclable materials were unavailable, we used the average 
revenue (adjusted for location) across communities that reported revenue sales.  This amounted to $0.44 per 
household per month.  
cBased on figures provided by Neal Johnson, Recycling Coordinator, December 2002.  
dIncludes once-a-month curbside collection of household hazardous waste and green waste.  
eBased on figures 
provided by ILSR (1991).  
fApproximately 56 percent of households (those located in the “north section” of the 
city) participate a commingled program, while the remaining 44 percent (located in the “south section”) 
participate in a non-sorting program.  
gProcessing costs are inferred using Franklin Associates, Ltd. (1997) at 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
Variables Description 
Ethical Duty  Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment? 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Monetary  Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money?  1= yes, 0 = no. 
Primarily Ethics  Which most encourages your household to recycle?  1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money. 
Dropoff Distance  Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site. 
Dropoff User  In the past 12 months has your household used dropoff recycling?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Young  1 if 18<Age<35, 0 otherwise. 
Old  1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise. 
Male  1 = male, 0 = female. 
High School  Highest level of education in household?  1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise 
Associates  1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise 
Bachelors  1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise 
Masters  1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise 
Ph.D.  1 = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise 
Household Size  Number of adults in household, other than the respondent. 
Environmental Org.  Anyone in your household belong to an environmental organization?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Med Income  1 if $35K/yr<Household Income<$75K/yr, 0 otherwise 
High Income  1 if $75K/yr<Household Income, 0 otherwise 
Employed  Adult with the highest income currently employed?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Retired  Adult with the highest income currently retired?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Short Cheap Talk  1 = received short cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Longer Cheap Talk  1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Sorting Required  1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise. 
Polite  1 if polite refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise. 
Angry  1 if angry refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise. 
Landfill Visit  Has anyone in your household visited your community’s landfill?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Landfill Distance  Distance to nearest landfill in miles. 
Landfill Distance > 2 mi.  Distance above and beyond 2 miles to nearest landfill, 0 otherwise. 
Hypothetical  1 = respondent valued a hypothetical CRP, 0 = otherwise. 
Precision  On a scale of 0-100, how certain are you of the answers to your WTP questions? 
English  Is English your first language?  1 = yes, 0 = no 
Employer Recycle  Do you recycle at work?  1 = yes, 0 = no 
Caucasian   What racial group best describes you?  1 = White or Caucasian, 0 otherwise 
Hispanic  What racial group best describes you?  1 = Hispanic, 0 otherwise 
African American  What racial group best describes you?  1 = Black or African American, 0 otherwise 
Generation Link  Were you (or other adults in your house) raised in recycling households?  1 =yes, 0 = no
Neighbor Recycle  Do most of your neighbors currently recycle? 
Years in Community  How many years have you lived in your community? 
Number of Children  How many children under the age of 18 currently live in your home? 
Attempt 1  Respondent available for survey after first dialing attempt. 
Attempt 2  Respondent available for survey after second dialing attempt. 
Fee Known  Respondent offer answer to how much household pays for current CRP?  1 = yes, 0 = no
Fee Difference  Stated CRP fee minus actual CRP fee. 
CRP Performance  Job performance of your current CRP?  1 = excellent or good, 0 = fair or poor 
Bid  Opening Bid u 
Notes. The description does not always exactly match the wording in the survey instrument.  To see the exact 
wording, please refer to www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/datareport.pdf. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models 






Probit Estimates  Explanatory Variables
† 
Coefficient P –Value  Coefficient  P –Value  Coefficient  P –Value 
Ethical  Duty  2.839***  0.000 3.299*** 0.001 4.725*** 0.000 
Monetary 0.289  0.244  0.797  0.200  -0.626  0.264 
Primarily  Ethics  1.167***  0.000 0.924**  0.023 1.414*** 0.003 
Dropoff  Distance  0.022  0.194 0.049 0.114 0.067 0.101 
Dropoff User  -0.056  0.398  -0.203  0.289  -0.422  0.178 
Young  1.507***  0.000  -0.681**  0.032 0.266 0.271 
Old -0.246  0.194  -0.464  0.184  -0.822*  0.096 
Male -0.557***  0.000  -0.238  0.171  -0.002  0.497 
High  School  0.512  0.138 0.044 0.484 1.150 0.160 
Some  College  0.643*  0.087  -0.254 0.407 1.196 0.150 
Associates 0.276  0.291  0.243  0.413  1.542*  0.100 
Bachelors 0.822**  0.039  0.522  0.313  1.803*  0.060 
Masters 0.858**  0.039  0.969  0.193  2.199**  0.034 
Ph.D. 1.518***  0.002  0.431  0.353  2.039*  0.053 
Household  Size  0.093  0.127  -0.026 0.424 0.026 0.438 
Environmental  Organization    1.319***  0.000 0.802**  0.039 1.567*** 0.003 
Med  Income  -0.011  0.478 0.043 0.454 0.139 0.377 
High  Income  0.165  0.241  -0.060 0.440 0.484 0.159 
Employed  3.732**  0.024  1.273**  0.041 0.246 0.364 
Retired 0.161  0.331  1.381**  0.039  1.334*  0.054 
English 0.777*  0.079  -1.111  0.230  -1.711  0.118 
Caucasian 0.681***  0.005  -0.135  0.376  -0.645  0.116 
Hispanic 0.215  0.278  -0.379  0.279  -0.919  0.124 
African American  0.071  0.442  1.129  0.117  -0.071  0.473 
Generational  Link  0.181 0.120  0.238  0.186 0.547** 0.050 
Neighbors  Recycle  -0.220  0.155  --- --- --- --- 
Number of Children  -0.049  0.200  0.106  0.119  -0.048  0.327 
Call Attempt #1  -0.182  0.183  0.492*  0.070  0.810**  0.024 
Call Attempt #2  -0.477**  0.028  0.350  0.193  0.706*  0.080 
Years in Community  -0.020***  0.000  -0.008  0.199  -0.007  0.267 
Employer  Recycle  0.005 0.490  0.186  0.281 0.884** 0.018 
Polite  -0.698***  0.002 -0.487*  0.086 -0.895** 0.026 
Angry  -0.394  0.323  -0.075 0.481 1.270 0.233 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models (continued) 
Fee Known  -0.455**  0.015  1.094***  0.003  ---  --- 
Fee Overstated  0.069***  0.000  -0.013  0.235  ---  --- 
CRP  Performance  2.027***  0.000  --- --- --- --- 
Sorting Required  -0.261*  0.076  ---  ---  -1.140***  0.004 
Landfill  Visit  0.029  0.435  0.132 0.325 0.089 0.402 
Landfill  Distance  -1.731 0.117  0.211  0.147 0.570*** 0.010 
Landfill Distance > 2 mi.  1.747  0.115  -0.234  0.136  -0.674***  0.005 
Short Cheap Talk  0.351**  0.021  1.301*  0.075  1.362**  0.031 
Longer  Cheap  Talk  0.694***  0.000 1.839**  0.024 2.307*** 0.002 
CRP  Community  -1.021***  0.000      
Voluntary CRP Hypothetical Bias      1.967***  0.003     
Mandatory CRP Hypothetical Bias         2.645**  0.017 
No CRP Hypothetical Bias          2.765***  0.000 
Constant 1.798*** 0.000 2.359*** 0.000 2.828*** 0.000 
Bid 0.190***  0.000  0.220* 0.058 0.158* 0.073 
Voluntary SP      2.428***  0.000     
Mandatory SP          1.277**  0.013 
Hetero. 
No CRP SP          1.050***  0.005 
Sample Size  4012  1168  2114 
Mean WTP  5.368  ---  --- 
Calibrated Mean WTP  2.922  ---  --- 
Notes.  (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  The estimates for the 
constant terms, community dummy variables, as well as the dummy variables for “don’t know” and “missing responses” are 
not shown. 
†Although not explicitly listed as an explanatory variable, we control for BID in creating the probabilities that 
enter the likelihood function.  See Cameron and James (1987) for further details.   30
Table 4.  Calibrated WTP for Select Cities 













Tempe, AZ  M  7.57  -2.65  -0.03  4.89 
Longmont, CO  M  7.21  -2.65
  -0.02 4.54 
Orem, UT  V  5.75  -1.97  +0.05  3.83 
Wichita, KS  V  5.16  -1.97  +0.15  3.34 
Fargo, ND  V  4.86  -1.97  +0.07  2.96 
Abilene, TX  N  4.97  -2.77  +0.06  2.26 
Palo Alto, CA  M  5.03  -2.65  -0.36  2.02 
Olathe, KS
  V 4.06  -1.97  -0.07  2.02 
Peoria, AZ  N  4.81  -2.77  -0.02  2.02 
Escondido, CA  M  4.58  -2.65  +0.04  1.97 
Inglewood, CA  N  4.06  -2.77  +0.36  1.65 
Newport Beach, CA  M  4.09  -2.65  -0.30  1.14 
Notes:   Mandatory and voluntary CRP cities were selected due to the availability of cost data.  Three representative 
non-CRP cities were chosen at random.  The correction for differences between the sample and population 
demographics includes the variables:  gender, age, education, household size, income, primary language and race.  Table 5.  City Comparisons of Net Benefits and Theoretical CRP Predictions 
City WTP    Cost  Net Benefit
(WTP-Cost)
CRP 
Type  CRP Predictions
 
Tempe, AZ  4.89  1.62  3.27  M  CRP 
Longmont, CO  4.54  3.03
  1.51 M  CRP 
Orem, UT  3.83  2.78  1.05  V  CRP  
Wichita, KS  3.34  2.93
a  0.41 V  CRP 
Fargo, ND  2.96  2.68  0.28  V  CRP  
Abilene, TX  2.26  2.93
a -0.67  N  No  CRP 
Peoria, AZ  2.02  2.93
a -0.91  N  No  CRP 
Escondido, CA  1.97  3.16  -1.19  M
b  No CRP 
Inglewood, CA  1.65  2.93
a -1.28  N  No  CRP 
Olathe, KS
  2.02 3.58  -1.56  V  No  CRP 
Newport Beach, CA  1.14  3.42  -2.28  M
b No  CRP 
Palo Alto, CA  2.02  5.10  -3.08  M
b No  CRP 
Notes:  (a) The overall mean cost estimate from Table 1.  (b) Theoretical prediction does not account for 
state-mandated recycling goals.    
  
 